Optimal climate policy should act in a precautionary fashion to deal with tipping points that occur at some future random moment. The optimal carbon tax should include an additional component on top of the conventional present discounted value of marginal global warming damages. This component increases with the sensitivity of the hazard to temperature or the stock of atmospheric carbon. If the hazard of a catastrophe is constant, no correction is needed of the usual Pigouvian tax. The results are applied to a tipping point resulting from an abrupt and irreversible release of greenhouse gases from the ocean floors and surface of the earth, which set in motion a positive feedback loop. Convex enough hazard functions cause overshooting of the carbon tax, but a linear hazard function gives rise to undershooting. A more convex hazard function and a high discount rate speed up adjustment.
Introduction
The idea that the prime role of climate policy is to deal with the small risk of abrupt and often irreversible climate disasters and tipping points at high temperatures rather than to internalize smooth global warming damages at low and moderate temperatures is gaining traction (e.g., Lenton and Ciscar, 2013; Kopits et al., 2013; Pindyck, 2013) . Climate policy must deal with catastrophic events such as destroying a large chunk of productive capacity or unleashing positive feedback loops at higher temperatures. A well-known example is the ice-albedo effect. Global warming may be accelerated with sudden melting of ice sheets (e.g., Greenland), since water and earth reflect less solar radiation than ice and absorb more heat. The warming up causes more ice to melt and sets in motion even more global warming. The positive feedback acts more quickly over the oceans than over land, because sea ice can melt faster than continental ice sheets. Positive feedbacks can also occur with the death of rain forests as plants have a lower reflectivity than bare soil and there will be less transpiration. A final example is the Clathrate gun hypothesis, which states that a rise in sea temperatures and/or a rise in sea levels can trigger the sudden release of methane from methane clathrate compounds buried in sea-beds and permafrost (e.g., from the tundra in the Arctic, mostly Eastern Siberia). Since methane is itself a powerful (albeit shorter lived) greenhouse gas, this methane release will increase global warming and set in motion further methane clathrate destabilization.
This type of positive feedback might trigger a runaway process, which in the long run is stabilized via the natural decay of the stock of atmospheric carbon. There is a lot of debate about whether these positive feedback effects will occur at higher temperatures and also about the magnitude of such effects. We have nothing to contribute to this debate. Our objective is to investigate how a small risk of an irreversible, sudden release of greenhouse gases but a risk which rises at higher temperatures should affect optimal climate policy and alters the system dynamics.
It has been argued forcefully that the possibility of a catastrophic outcome with a substantial drop in welfare is the most important driver of the social cost of carbon (Pindyck, 2013) .
1 Indeed, some recent general equilibrium studies of growth and climate change have analyzed climate tipping in extended versions of the DICE model and show that the threat of a tipping point which increases with global mean temperature induces significant and immediate increases in the social cost of carbon and thus the optimal carbon tax (Lemoine and Traeger, 2012; Cai et al., 2012; van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 2013) . These follow earlier partial equilibrium studies on the analysis of climate catastrophes (e.g., Tsur and Zemel, 1996 , 2009 Naevdal, 2006; Karp and Tsur, 2011; Tsur and Withagen, 2013) and on sudden collapses of the resource stock and changes in the system dynamics (regime switches) in resource management and pollution control (e.g., Cropper, 1976; Heal, 1984; Clarke and Reed, 1994; Polasky et al., 2011; de Zeeuw and Zemel, 2012) .
Our objective is to show how the optimal carbon tax and the social cost of carbon have to be adjusted upwards from the normal Pigouvian formula in a tractable partial equilibrium model of climate policy with tipping points generating regime switches and changes in the carbon cycle and the system dynamics at some random future moment of time. We thus investigate how the carbon tax should respond to a sudden unleashing of positive feedback loops at higher global mean temperatures and change in system dynamics (cf., Naevdal, 2006) 2 . The expected time it takes to unleash such positive feedback loops decreases with temperature and the accumulated carbon stock, which results from a hazard function which increases in the carbon stock. Our contribution is related to recent work on discrete thresholds for the stock of carbon in the atmosphere or global mean temperature which once passed result in a regime of much less assimilative capacity of carbon (Amigues and Moreaux, 2012; Prieur et al., 2013) . 3 This work also deals with changes in system dynamics resulting from positive feedback or a change in capacity to assimilate carbon, but it takes the threshold as given. In contrast, we have an uncertain threshold as we have the risk of tipping increasing with the carbon stock or global mean temperature.
We also show how the optimal social cost of carbon can be decomposed into three effects. First, there is the need to correct for marginal global warming damages. This requires the social cost of carbon to be set to at least the present value of all future marginal global warming damages with the discount rate augmented by the hazard of a tipping point as well as the rate of atmospheric decay. The hazard makes society more impatient, so the marginal global warming damages are discounted more heavily which depresses this conventional expression for the Pigouvian social cost of carbon. Second, burning more fossil fuel increases the stock of atmospheric carbon and curbs the welfare after the tipping point. This raises the cost of a tipping point and thus requires a boost to the social cost of carbon before the disaster strikes. Third, burning fossil fuel increases global mean temperature and thus increases the risk of a tipping point and a discrete catastrophic loss in value. This necessitates a boost to the social cost of carbon, since this curbs fossil fuel use and the risk of a tipping point. We illustrate our results with some calibrated simulations. This permits us to also investigate how the optimal carbon tax and social cost of 2 This is related to recent work on discrete thresholds which result in a regime of much less assimilative capacity of carbon once the stock of carbon in the atmosphere crosses a given threshold (Amigues and Moreaux, 2012) and on a an economy with exhaustible resources and a regime switch entailing a total destruction of assimilative capacity with zero decay of atmospheric carbon (Prieur et al, 2013) . 3 Prieur et al. (2013) deal with an economy with exhaustible resources and a regime switch entailing a total destruction of assimilative capacity with zero decay of atmospheric carbon.
carbon depend on the convexity of the hazard function, since it is plausible that the risk of a tipping point increases relatively more at higher temperatures.
Section 2 sets up the general model of regime switches and climate systems resulting from tipping points and shows how this can be stripped down to a tractable model. Section 3 derives the optimal climate policies in the presence of abrupt and irreversible unlocking of positive feedback loops in the carbon cycle which result from a tipping point at some future moment in time. Section 4 offers an illustrative calibration of our model paying attention to both linear and convex hazard functions. Section 5 presents indicative calculations of how the optimal carbon should be adjusted upwards given an endogenous risk for the sudden release of greenhouse gases and investigates the sensitivity of the social cost of carbon to the shape of the hazard function for such a climate catastrophe. Section 6 concludes.
Regime switches and climate systems
The problem of designing optimal climate policy in the face of smooth global warming damages and three different types of impending climate catastrophes can be formulated as:
,
where Y denotes exogenous aggregate income, E indicates fossil fuel consumption (measured in tons of carbon), d is the constant cost of fossil fuel extraction, P P , P T and P denote the permanent, transient and total stocks of carbon in the atmosphere, respectively, R is the stock of fossil fuel in the crust of the earth, and S is the stock of carbon that is absorbed in the oceans (and by the surface of the earth). T  , T  and T  are the times at which, respectively, catastrophes ,  and  strike. These times are stochastic variables.
Equations (2a) and (2b) Equations (2d) and (2e) give the depletion of fossil fuel reserves and the absorption of carbon in the oceans, respectively. Note that the sum of the stocks of carbon in situ, the atmosphere and the oceans must be constant, so that we have 0.
Equations (2f), (2g) and (2h) allow for three types of catastrophes. The first one is an abrupt and irreversible shock to the utility obtained from using fossil fuel, . This may arise when a disaster (e.g., a hurricane) hits productive capacity, pushes up the price of fossil fuel and thus reduces utility. 4 The second one is an abrupt and irreversible shock to global warming damages, , which may arise with a climate disaster which destroys natural habits (e.g., a sudden acidification of oceans destroying coral reefs or the sudden loss of rainforests). These first two types of climate calamities are discussed in van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (2013) within the context of a general equilibrium Ramsey growth model with energy as a factor of production. The third shock corresponds to the sudden unleashing of a positive feedback loop which causes ongoing extra release of carbon emissions from the ocean floors into the atmosphere,  P, where  is a constant. The amount of carbon released once the positive feedback loop is unleashed thus increases with temperature or the total atmospheric carbon stock, P.
Finally, equation (2i) gives the probability of a catastrophe occurring before time t . We model uncertainty of a catastrophe with the hazard rate
is the conditional density, so that h(t)t is the probability of a disaster given that no disaster has taken place up time t. The probability that the event occurs between t and t+∆t can be approximated by f(t)∆t, where f(t) is the probability density function. A constant hazard rate h implies a probability density function f(t) =he ht for the date T of climate change, which yields the cumulative density function Pr[T < t] = 1 -e ht (i.e., the probability of the catastrophe occurring before time t) with mean 1/h, so that the probability of "survival" is given by e -ht
. and of a stock-dependent hazard rate h(t) = H(P(t)) to capture the effect that a higher stock of carbon in the atmosphere increases the probability of climate change (i.e., H(P) > 0). Hence, if the stock of atmospheric carbon increases over time, the expected duration before the catastrophe occurs, 1/H(P), decreases over time. A failing climate policy thus makes catastrophe more imminent.
To have a well-defined problem, we suppose that utility U is concave, global warming damages D are weakly convex, and the hazard function H is constant or increases in the carbon stock at a non-decreasing rate and is thus weakly convex. Furthermore, we suppose that positive feedback will lead to 'runaway' global warming in the short and medium run but will eventually be checked by the process of natural decay of the stock of atmospheric carbon.
Since we want to focus on the economics of regime switches and tipping points, we adopt a partial equilibrium model which abstracts from capital accumulation, the interest rate, and growth and development. Utility is the area under the demand curve for fossil fuel. Hence, the price of fossil fuel must equal '( , ) . p U E  The supply of fossil fuel is infinitely elastic.
The remainder of this paper focuses on the shock corresponding to the sudden release of greenhouse gases resulting from the emergence of positive feedback which is more likely to occur at higher temperatures.
We therefore set  =  = 0 and T  = T from now on. To get more tractable results, we will also from now on assume that fossil fuel reserves are abundant (infinite S 0 ), so that our problem for the global social planner with abrupt and irreversible release of carbon emissions from the ocean floors simplifies to:
Three final comments are in order. First, equation (1) (2d) or (2d) implies that the passing of time t gradually raises the probability that a climate disaster has occurred at some time T before that, especially if the hazard rates are high and rising with the stock of atmospheric carbon and temperature. Third, we are solving this as a social planner problem but the social optimum can be realized in a decentralized market economy provided the climate externalities resulting from smooth global warming damages and from impending catastrophes are internalized via an appropriate carbon tax.
Hence, we ignore imperfect competition in fossil fuel markets and other externalities. We also suppose that the carbon tax revenues are rebated in lump-sum fashion and abstract from other distorting taxes. In that case, the social optimum is replicated if the carbon tax is set to the optimal social cost of carbon.
Optimal climate policy with positive feedback loops
To find the optimal climate policy, we must solve the problem of (1) and (2). We do this by backwards recursion, so we first solve for the post-catastrophe regime and then for the pre-catastrophe regime.
Post-catastrophe regime
The Hamiltonian function for the post-catastrophe outcome is defined as follows:
where  P and  T denote the shadow cost of the permanent and transient stocks of atmospheric carbon, respectively. We thus have the following optimality conditions for t  T:
To replicate the social optimum in a decentralized market economy a price has to be charged for carbon which has to correspond to the social cost of carbon. This can be a specific carbon tax or the price of an emission permit. For ease of the discussion, we will refer to it as the carbon tax and will use it interchangeably with the social cost of carbon. The carbon tax has to be set to , Optimality condition (4a) can be used to give energy demand as decreasing function of the carbon tax:
We thus have the following after-calamity saddle-point system of differential equations:
where equations (6c) and (6d) follow from the optimality conditions (4b) and (4c).
Immediately after the climate catastrophe has taken place, the permanent and transient components of the carbon tax must jump to place the system on its stable after-calamity manifold:
and ( , ), .
The Bellman equation for the after-catastrophe problem is:
where V A is the after-catastrophe value function,
and .
It follows from (8) and equations (5) and (6) that the after-catastrophe value function can be calculated from:
where utility of both fossil fuel and other consumption (excluding the carbon tax rebates) is defined as:
From (5) we see that marginal effect of an increase in the carbon tax on total utility is negative, namely the negative of fossil fuel consumption.
To make it easier to highlight the effects of regime switches, we let global warming damages be linear.
In that case, the after-catastrophe optimal carbon tax is constant (from equations (6c) and (6d)) and thus energy use is constant is too in the post-catastrophe regime:
Hence, with linear global warming damages the optimal carbon tax is independent of the prevailing stock of carbon and temperature. This after-catastrophe carbon tax exceeds the naïve Pigouvian carbon tax which does not take account of the unleashed positive feedback and associated change in system dynamics, denoted by  P . The optimal carbon tax thus corrects for the positive feedback in the carbon cycle. We simplify further by abstracting from the permanent component of the atmospheric carbon stock.
Assumption 3:  = 0.
With assumption 3 it is easy to establish that the after-disaster value and Pigouvian carbon tax become:
The after-catastrophe value function with linear damages thus decreases in the stock of atmospheric carbon and the size of the disaster. Of course, the marginal cost of the carbon stock is the aftercatastrophe carbon tax. The after-disaster value is also negatively affected by the extra release of carbon emissions from the ocean floors resulting from positive feedback. Hence, the after-disaster carbon tax exceeds the naïve Pigouvian tax which does not take account of positive feedback, denoted by  N , and equals the ratio of the marginal global warming damage divided by the discount rate plus the decay rate minus the rate of carbon accumulation resulting from positive feedback. Positive feedback thus pushes up the after-catastrophe Pigouvian carbon tax.
Pre-catastrophe regime
The Hamilton-Jacobi--Bellman equation for the pre-catastrophe regime given assumptions 1, 2 and 3 is:
.
The final term on the right-hand side of (12) is the expected loss in value at the time that the catastrophe strikes. Through this term the before-catastrophe value function depends on the size of the catastrophe, .
The optimality condition for (12) is, as before, equation (5) 
Differentiating equation (12) or (13) with respect to time and using equations (9) and (10) yields:
Simplifying equation (14) and using ,
Since this equation must hold for any 0, P  we get the following dynamics of the social cost of carbon:
Integration of (15) yields the expression for the pre-disaster optimal social cost of carbon:
modified conventional no-shock social cost of carbon 'raising the stakes' effect ( Proposition 1: If the hazard rate is constant, H(P) = h 0 > 0, the before-calamity carbon tax is smaller than the after-calamity carbon tax rate but bigger than the conventional, naïve Pigouvian carbon tax:
Hence, with a constant hazard, the conventional no-shock carbon tax term is dominated by the 'raising the stakes' term in (16) so that the before-catastrophe carbon tax is always set above the conventional Pigouvian tax. However, the before-catastrophe carbon tax is set below the after-catastrophe carbon tax.
In general, the hazard rate increases with the carbon stock and global mean temperature in which case the following components of optimal climate policy can be highlighted:
1. The first term in (16) is the conventional present value of marginal global warming damages, but is reduced by the 'making hay while the sun shines' effect as the hazard rate has to be added to the sum of the discount rate and the atmospheric decay rate. The hazard of a catastrophe and the belief that good times eventually come to an end makes society more impatient, so marginal global warming damages are discounted more heavily which depresses the social cost of carbon below the expression given in (11). In fact, this 'making hay' effect also depresses the 'raising the stakes' and 'averting risk' effects in (16), and is stronger if the risk of catastrophe is higher.
2. The 'raising the stakes' effect in (16) is a consequence of burning more fossil fuel increasing the stock of atmospheric carbon and thereby increasing marginal global warming damages. Since a marginal increase in the carbon stock curbs the value after the climate calamity (with the size of the effect equal to the after-calamity carbon tax), this raises the stakes (the drop in welfare following a catastrophe) and thus boosts the social cost of carbon before the calamity strikes.
3. The 'risk averting' effect in (16) arises from taking account of the fact that burning fossil fuel leads to a higher stock of atmospheric carbon and higher global mean temperature. This increases the risk of climate catastrophe and the chance of a discrete non-marginal catastrophic loss in value resulting from the eventual regime switch.
The expression for the optimal social cost of carbon is, in general, difficult to evaluate, since one needs to know the whole time trajectory of the stock of atmospheric carbon. To do this, one needs to solve equation (15) together with the pre-catastrophe dynamics of the atmospheric carbon stock,
as a saddle-path system to give the stable manifold:
The condition for saddle-path stability of the system of ordinary equations (15) and (18) is that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix has to be negative. This is the case if:
The first term in (20) is always positive, the second term is positive given that the pre-catastrophe carbon tax is less than the after-catastrophe carbon tax, and the third term is positive for convex hazard functions given that welfare is higher before the catastrophe strikes than afterwards. Hence, we assume that the saddle-point stability condition (20) is satisfied. Upon substitution of (19) into (18), we can simulate forwards in time. By substituting (19) into (13) we get the value function for the pre-catastrophe system.
The following proposition gives the steady state before-catastrophe social cost of carbon (denoted by an asterisk) with a stock-dependent hazard rate. The dynamics are given in proposition 3.
Proposition 2:
The steady-state pre-catastrophe carbon tax and carbon stock follow from:
A bigger positive feedback (higher ) curbs the carbon tax with a constant hazard (he first term in (21a)), but increases the risk-averting component of the carbon tax (the second term in (21a)).
Proof: see appendix.
The sensitivity of the hazard rate to the carbon stock or global mean temperature thus implies that the steady-state carbon tax must be set even higher than the no-shock carbon tax,  N (given in (11)), and the carbon tax corresponding to a constant hazard rate is set to the steady-state hazard rate. If the hazard increases in the carbon stock, H(P) with H > 0, the climate tipping point becomes more imminent as the atmosphere continues to accumulate carbon and global mean temperature rises. By setting a higher carbon tax, the economy steers away from the risk of a disaster by reducing the hazard of a sudden release of carbon from the ocean floors occurring setting in motion a process of positive feedback. Hence, the steady-state optimal carbon tax is pushed up by the 'risk averting' effect above the carbon tax suggested by the conventional Pigouvian carbon to deal with smooth damages and the 'making hay' effect, corrected for the 'making hay' effect (i.e., the first term in equation (21a)).
We can solve equations (15) and (18) for the transient time paths of the carbon tax and the stock of atmospheric carbon. Fig. 1(a) gives the phase diagram if
The red line is the locus of points for which 0 P  holds and the green line is the locus of points for which 0   holds. We then have that, upon the realization of an impending catastrophe, the carbon tax jumps up and undershoots its steady state value and subsequently travels along the saddle-path in north-westerly direction. Fig. 1(b) shows the phase diagram for the case  < 0 in which case the carbon tax overshoots its steady-state value before adjusting along the saddle-path in south-westerly direction. The undershooting case occurs for linear and for not too convex hazard functions, but overshooting of the social cost of carbon occurs for convex enough hazard functions. We offer an approximation of these transient time paths based on log-linearization of the saddle-path system defined by (15) and (18) given the pre-catastrophe steady state characterized in proposition 2.
Proposition 3: First-order approximations of the before-catastrophe time paths for the optimal carbon tax and the stock of carbon in the atmosphere are given by: Examining the definition of  in (20), we see that  increases if the hazard function is more convex and thus the speed of adjustment of the pre-catastrophe system is higher. We will now apply propositions 2 and 3 to an illustrative calibration of our model to inform us of how the carbon tax, carbon stock and temperature are affected by the hazard of a sudden and irreversible release of greenhouse gases from the ocean floors when the hazard itself increases with the carbon stock and global mean temperature.
Illustrative calibration
We first calibrate energy demand, global mean temperature, the marginal global warming damage, the discount rate, and the implied conventional social cost of carbon. We also discuss the calibration of the size of the climate hazard and the functional form of the hazard function. We then offer some calculations on how the steady-state and transient paths of the social cost of carbon are affected by impending climate catastrophes resulting in abrupt and irreversible release of greenhouse gas.
Energy demand and utility
From the BP Statistical Review fossil fuel consumption in 2010 is 8.3 Giga tons of carbon. We take the cost fossil fuel to be 3.7 US $ per million BTU or equivalently 504 US $ per ton of carbon, which is a fairly low figure to reflect the abundance of coal. We suppose a constant elasticity of fossil fuel demand of  = 0.85, which implies that utility of fossil fuel consumption is 
. Utility of consumption of fossil fuel and other consumption goods is given by
where Y is set to the 2010 value of world GDP, 63 trillion US dollars.
Global mean temperature and the initial carbon stock in the atmosphere
To calculate the global mean temperature Temp, we follow IPPC (2007) and assume an equilibrium climate sensitivity of 3. This implies that doubling the stock of atmospheric carbon yields an increase in global mean temperature of 3 degrees Celsius. Hence, 3ln( / 581) / ln(2) Temp P  with 581 GtC equal to the pre-industrial stock of atmospheric carbon. The 2010 stock of carbon equals P 0 = 826 GtC.
Marginal global warming damage, the discount rate and carbon decay
Empirical integrated assessment models of climate change yield estimates of the social cost of carbon ranging from 5 to 35 US $ per ton of carbon in 2010 and rising to US $16 to $50 per ton in 2050 (e.g., the DICE, PAGE and FUND models described in Nordhaus (2008) , Hope (2006) and Tol (2002) , respectively). We will calibrate our model to a ballpark social cost of carbon of 25 US $ per ton of carbon when only taking account of smooth global warming damages and not of impending climate disasters. We set the discount rate to 1.5% per annum,  = 0.015, and the rate of atmospheric decay of the stock of atmospheric carbon to 0.4% per annum,  = 0.004, which gives a marginal global warming damage parameter of  = ( + )  N = 0.019 x 25 = 0.475. The Stern Review obtains much higher estimates of the social cost of carbon with a much lower discount rate of only 0.1% per annum (e.g., Stern (2007) ). This yields a no-shock social cost of carbon of 0.475/(0.001+0.004) = 95 US $ per ton of carbon.
The size and hazard of a climate catastrophe
Unfortunately, there is almost no information on the functional specification and calibration of the hazard function. To make some headway, we make bold assumptions about the size and hazard of the disaster.
As far as the size of the impending climate disaster is concerned, we set the positive feedback parameter  = 0.028 which corresponds to a massive release of carbon from the ocean floors.
To calibrate the climate calamity hazard function, we suppose that the expected duration for the climate catastrophe to hit is 14.7 years if the carbon concentration stays put at 2324 GtC and global mean temperature remains unchanged at 6 degrees Celsius (cf. Nordhaus, 2008; Golosov et al., 2012) . This gives a hazard rate of 0.068. We suppose that the expected duration for disaster to strike at the current carbon stock of 826 GtC is hundred years, so H(826 GtC) = 0.01. We use these two points to calibrate the following linear hazard function: (24) 5 ( ) 0.01 3.872 10 ( 826).
It may be more reasonable to suppose that the hazard function is convex, so that the hazard rate starts increasing more rapidly once the carbon stock and temperature are high enough. Hence, we also calibrate a quadratic hazard function to the same two points:
82 ( ) 0.01 2.585 10 ( 826) . Fig. 2 indicates that the quadratic hazard function lies over the whole range below the linear hazard function, but it rises more steeply at higher levels of the carbons stock. Fig. 2 also plots a cubic and a quartic hazard function calibrated again to the same two points which imply that the hazard rate rises even more steeply at higher temperatures. 
After-catastrophe social cost of carbon
We have calibrated our model such that the social cost of carbon with a discount rate of 1.5% per year equals 25 US $/tC if no account is taken of the impending abrupt release of carbon and positive feedback.
This curbs fossil use from 8.3 to 7.5 GtC per year. After the disaster has struck, the social cost of carbon and the global carbon tax have to be increased to curb fossil fuel use:
(25) 29 25 US $/tC and ( ) ( ) 7.4 7.5 GtC, .
The steady-state carbon stock is thus curbed from 1882 to 1852 GtC, which leads to a modest cut in ultimate global warming from 5.09 to 5.02 degrees Celsius. The increase in the social cost of carbon as a result of the climate catastrophe is much higher with a very low discount rate of 0.1% per year which thus necessitates a much more ambitious climate policy (cf., Stern, 2007) ):
(25) 216 95 US $/tC and ( ) ( ) 4.5 6.0 GtC, .
As a result, the steady-state carbon stock is substantially reduced from 1501 GtC in the absence of disaster to 1126 GtC with disaster which makes a much bigger dent in global warming from 4.11 to 2.86 degrees Celsius. The speed of adjustment of the after-calamity system is much slower than of the nocalamity system, i.e.,    = 0.0012 <  = 0.005, which is a dire consequence of the positive feedback in the carbon cycle. 
Before-catastrophe social cost of carbon: constant hazard rate
With a constant hazard rate set to h 0 = 0.03 and a discount rate of 1.5% per annum we obtain a carbon tax in between the no-shock and after-catastrophe carbon tax: 
With a lower discount rate of  = 0.001 (as in Stern (2007)), the effects are much more pronounced: There are various striking observations. First, the carbon tax undershoots with linear hazard functions but overshoots its steady-state value on impact of the realization of the impending catastrophe with all of the three convex hazard functions shown in fig. 2 . Second, the overshooting is more severe for more convex hazard functions as can be seen from the increasing modulus of the manifold elasticity, , and also more severe for lower discount rates. Third, adjustment of the before-catastrophe carbon tax and the carbon stock is faster for more convex hazard functions but slower for lower discount rates. Fourth, the magnitude of the optimal carbon tax and the mitigating impact of the catastrophe on carbon accumulation and temperature are much higher for a low than for a high discount rate.
Illustrative time paths for when the catastrophe strikes after in 2090 for  = 0.1% per annum and a quartic hazard function are presented in fig. 3 . This is the case of a convex hazard function and short-run overshooting of the social cost of carbon. Although the stock of atmospheric carbon rises to an alarming 3753 GtC in the long run, this occurs at a very slow rate of only 0.12% per annum. This is why the carbon stock has only increased to 1135 GtC whilst it would have been 1097 GtC if the disaster would not have struck in 2090. This suggests that the adverse effects on global warming of unleashed positive feedback in the carbon cycle can take many decades, even centuries before all the cumulated harm has been done.
Elasticity of fossil fuel demand and the pre-catastrophe social cost of carbon
Given linear smooth global warming damages (assumption 2), the after-catastrophe social cost of carbon is unaffected by the price elasticity of fossil fuel demand, , or by the cost of supplying fossil fuel to the market, d. However, this is not the case for the pre-catastrophe social cost of carbon as these factors affect fossil fuel emissions and thus eventually affect temperature and the risk of climate disaster as well. For example, if the price elasticity of fossil fuel demand is only 0.4 instead of 0.85, the business-as-usual scenario is unaffected (as it is the base for the calibration). The post-catastrophe carbon tax is (215.9 US $/tC if  = 0.1% as in Stern (2007) ) also unaffected, but fossil fuel demand is higher after the disaster and thus the carbon stock is higher also (5187 instead of 3753 GtC) and global warming is more severe (9.47 versus 8.07 degrees Celsius). The pre-catastrophe carbon tax is, however, reduced from 204.3 to 197.1 US $/tC. The initial carbon tax is only somewhat lower (214.7 instead of 215.5 US $/tC). The optimal social cost of carbon is thus not much affected by the price elasticity of fossil fuel demand. We conclude that, if better substitutes for fossil fuel that arrive on the market push up the elasticity, the carbon tax does not have to be raised by much.
Conclusion
We have analyzed how the first-best optimal carbon tax should be adjusted in the face of impending climate disasters such as a sudden, irreversible release of greenhouse gases from the ocean floors when such disasters are more likely to occur if the stock of atmospheric carbon and temperature are high. We have shown how the optimal global carbon tax should be increased over and above the conventional There is also a second term pushing up the carbon tax, which captures that burning an additional unit of fossil fuel raises temperature and thus lowers after-calamity welfare. This means that the stakes are raised, since the fall in welfare following a climate catastrophe is bigger.
We have also shown that the initial social cost of carbon or carbon tax undershoots its steady-state value for a linear hazard function, but overshoots for convex enough hazard functions. We also find that the before-catastrophe carbon tax and the carbon stock adjust more quickly for more convex hazard functions but more slowly for lower discount rates. The optimal carbon tax and the mitigating impact of the catastrophe on carbon accumulation and temperature are much higher for a low than a high discount rate.
Calibrating our model to a social cost of carbon of 25 US $/tC, a rate of atmospheric decay of 0.4% of the carbon stock per annum and a discount rate of 1.5% per annum, we consider the hazard of a sudden, irreversible release of carbon corresponding to a positive feedback of 0.12% of the carbon stock per annum. Pinning down the hazard rate at 6 degrees Celsius to 0.068, we find that for a linear hazard function the social cost of carbon jumps up to 27.7 US $/tC and then rises gradually to 28.1 US $/tC until the catastrophe strikes from which point onwards the social cost of carbon is raised to 29.3 US $/tC.
Hence, the effects of the impending catastrophe are 'small potatoes'. 5 However, with a discount rate of 0.1% per annum as used in Stern (2007) the effects of the tipping point on the social cost of carbon are much more pronounced. The carbon tax jumps up to 184.8 US $/tC and then rises to 191.9 US $/tC.
When the catastrophe strikes the carbon tax is increased to 215.9 US $/tC. The effects are stronger for convex (such as the quadratic, cubic or quartic) hazard functions.
In a general equilibrium framework with Ramsey growth and an impending shock to total factor productivity one needs, in addition to a higher carbon tax to curb the risk of climate calamities, also precautionary capital accumulation to be better prepared for when the catastrophe strikes (e.g., van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 2013) . This precautionary capital accumulation must take place even if the hazard rate is exogenous. If the hazard does depend on temperature, the carbon tax is pushed up which curbs fossil fuel demand and capital demand thereby offsetting precautionary capital accumulation. The risk of climate disaster will, in general, also make it attractive to shift capital that is used as engine of growth from the productive process to precautionary adaptation capital with the aim to mitigate the adverse effects of potential climate disasters (water defences etc.). Hence, as a result of the hazard of a climate catastrophe, adaptation capital increases and capital used in the production process falls, especially if the hazard increases strongly with global warming.
Future work should allow for multiple, possibly reversible and gradually emerging catastrophes with different temperature-dependent hazard rates and other types of climate uncertainty (cf., Lemoine and Traeger, 2013; Cai et al., 2012) . The challenge for future empirical research is to pin down the effect of raising the carbon tax and curbing temperature on the probability of climate disaster as well as on the baseline probability of climate disaster. With more knowledge of the shape of the hazard function we can improve our understanding of how much the carbon tax should be raised to cut the risk of climate disaster. Future work should also allow for a world in which there is a small risk that a climate disaster occurs but also a small probability that such a disaster is never going to materialize in which case (23) and (22), respectively.
